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Abstract 
This paper considers the so-called 'right to be forgotten', in the context of the 2014 decision of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González. It also considers the 'right 
of erasure' contained in the current EU Data Protection Directive, as well as the proposal for a 
new right of erasure to be included in the new EU data protection framework. The paper 
proposes a particular way of understanding the right to be forgotten and suggests a broad 
definition of it. It examines claims that the ECJ’s decision in Google ‘invented’ a right to be 
forgotten. It also considers whether individuals have a right to be forgotten under the current 
EU Directive, and whether they will have such a right when the new data protection regulation 
becomes law.  More generally, the paper considers whether a right to be forgotten has been 
recognised as an aspect of a broader right to privacy, and whether the Google decision moves 
us closer to an understanding of privacy as the right to an appropriate flow of information, in 
line with Nissenbaum’s framework of contextual integrity. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In recent years there has been considerable media and academic interest in the so-called ‘right to be 
forgotten’. The impetus for much of this focus has been the European Commission’s proposal to 
include a right to be forgotten in the new European Union (EU) Data Protection Regulation.1 This is 
so even though the reforms were billed as strengthening the right to be forgotten under the current 
European Directive on Data Protection,2 implying that the right to be forgotten already exists under 
European data protection law and is simply ‘in need of reinforcement’.3 More recently the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its decision in the case of Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v 
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1 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data’, COM (2012) 
11 final (‘Proposed Regulation’). See Meg Leta Ambrose and Jef Ausloos, ‘The Right to be Forgotten Across 
the Pond’ (2013) 3 Journal of Information Policy 1, 1.  
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3 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows:  A Critical Analysis of the Right to be Forgotten 
in Big Data Practice’ (2011) 8(3) SCRIPTed 1, 4.  This is also suggested by Recital 54 of Proposed Regulation 
COM (2012) 11 final which talks about Article 17 in terms of it strengthening the right to be forgotten. See also 
Viviane Reding, ‘Tomorrow’s Privacy: The Upcoming  Data Protection Reform for the European Union’ (2011) 
1(1) International Data Privacy Law 3, 4; Napoleon Xanthoulis, ‘The Right to Oblivion in the Information Age: 
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Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González.4 The Google decision 
has been widely described as a ruling on the right to be forgotten and even a decision that ‘invents’ a 
right to be forgotten.5  
The right to be forgotten has been described by some as the ‘biggest threat to free speech’ in the 
coming decade’6 and has provoked intense opposition and controversy among corporate and media 
interests, as well as academic commentators.7 Bernal has commented that the right to be forgotten 
provokes ‘emotional and instinctive reactions, often very negative, rather than rational or thought-
through responses.’8 The right to be forgotten is not, however, without its supporters and various 
reasons, outlined in Part Three of this paper, have been put forward as to why a right is needed. 
Despite this, there is little common understanding of what is actually meant by a right to be forgotten 
and it has been described as a ‘vague concept’9 and one which is ‘complex to formulate in legal terms 
because its ambit encompasses a wide range of different matters.’10  
This paper does not seek to critique arguments invoked either in support of or opposition to a right to 
be forgotten but to propose a particular way of understanding the right, and to suggest a broad 
definition of it. The paper considers claims that the ECJ’s decision in Google ‘invented’ a right to be 
forgotten, and considers whether individuals have a right to be forgotten arising from the current 
Directive, and from the Proposed Regulation should it become law.11 More broadly, consideration is 
given to whether a right to be forgotten has been recognised as an aspect of a broader right to privacy.  
Part Two of this paper discusses the meaning of the widely used term ‘the right to be forgotten’ and 
proposes a broad definition of the right, which distinguishes it from a right of erasure. Part Three 
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September 2014. 
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judgement.html>; Open Rights Group, ‘ECJ Google Spain Ruling Raises Concerns for Online Free Speech’  
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free-speech>; Rosen, ‘The Right to be Forgotten’ (n 6). 
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10 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Developments in the Right to be Forgotten’ (2013) 13(4) Human Rights Law Review 
761, 774.  
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March 2014, the Council of the European Union agreed its position on part of the Regulation. The Regulation 
will become law once it is adopted by the Council of Ministers further to the ordinary legislative procedure ‘co-
decision’: European Commission, ‘Data Protection: Progress on EU Reform Now Irreversible After European 




considers the rationale for and status of both a right of erasure and a right to be forgotten. Part Four 
summarises the findings of the ECJ in Google before offering a brief critique of that decision. Part 
Five considers the status of a right to be forgotten as an aspect of the broader right to privacy in light 
of the ECJ’s findings. This part also considers whether Google moves us closer to an understanding of 
privacy that is in line with that proposed by Nissenbaum: namely that a right to privacy is neither a 
right to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to appropriate flow of information.’12 Finally the 
paper offers some thoughts on the significance of Google and the future for a right to be forgotten. 
2. Interpreting the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
Although the term ‘the right to be forgotten’ is widely used, there is little common understanding of 
what is meant by it. Ambrose and Ausloos observe that ‘[t]wo versions of the right to be forgotten 
result in muddled conceptions and rhetoric when not distinguished.’13 One version of the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ is, they suggest, better described as a ‘right of erasure’ in relation to information that a data 
subject has disclosed passively: in other words, information that an individual has provided about 
him/herself to others, other than in the context of active content creation.14 When announcing the right 
to be forgotten as one of four pillars of the proposed new European data protection framework 
Viviane Reding, European Commission (‘EC’) Justice Commissioner, described it as a right for an 
individual to ‘have their data fully removed when they are no longer needed for the purposes for 
which they were collected or when he or she withdraws consent or when the storage period consented 
to has expired.’15  Reding’s conceptualisation of a right to be forgotten is therefore in line with what 
Ambrose and Ausloos describe as the ‘right of erasure’. Unlike the right of erasure described by 
Ambrose and Ausloos, however, Reding’s definition suggests that the right is not necessarily limited 
to information that individuals themselves have provided. The right would extend to personal data 
about that individual provided by others, if that information is kept for longer than necessary.16 
Reding’s formulation also suggests that the right of erasure would arise even in relation to information 
actively created by the individual where that is processed by a data controller on the basis of the data 
subject’s consent.  
Given that Reding is describing the right in the context of the EU data protection framework, her 
definition is of a right exercisable only against a ‘data controller’, within the meaning of the Proposed 
Regulation, rather than against the world at large.17 Reding’s formulation of a right to be forgotten 
also suggests that it is not always contingent upon the passage of time: where an individual has 
provided personal information about him/herself, the right (to call for erasure of the information) is 
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University Press, 2009) 127 (emphasis in original). 
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14 ibid, 14-15. An example of active content creation would be an individual authoring a blog which contained 
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15 Viviane Reding, ‘Tomorrow’s Privacy’ (n 3) 4.  
16 This description of a right to be forgotten should be contrasted with the earlier description provided by Reding 
who explained the right to be forgotten as a right for individuals to ‘withdraw their consent to the processing of 
the personal data they have given out themselves in situations where there is no legitimate reason for keeping 
it’: Viviane Reding, ‘The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern 
Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age’ (Press Release, Speech/12/26, 24 January 2012), 5.  
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use personal data in a private capacity, as such individuals are subject to the household exemption under the 




exercisable upon that individual withdrawing their consent to the processing of the information.18 The 
Proposed Regulation contains a right for an individual to withdraw their consent to the processing of 
personal information, where processing is based on that consent, at any time.19 In other words, the 
right of erasure based upon the withdrawal of consent is not dependent upon the passage of time. By 
contrast, where information has been provided about the individual by another (or where the 
individual has provided the information but not withdrawn their consent to its processing) the right of 
erasure is time dependent: it comes into existence only when retention of the information becomes 
unnecessary in light of the purposes for which it was originally collected or is processed.   
The other version of the right to be forgotten, as suggested by Ambrose and Ausloos, is based upon 
the French droit à l’oubli (or right of oblivion).20 Graux et al describe the right of oblivion as one 
which has historically been exercised in cases brought by those who have ‘temporarily entered the 
public limelight, and found themselves unable to shake off the unwanted attention when, after a given 
amount of time, it was no longer desired or warranted.’21 This right, which is not limited to France but 
finds expression in a number of European jurisdictions,22 is commonly invoked in cases where 
convicted criminals have sought to escape from publicity regarding the misdeeds of their past. An 
example of a decision of a Swiss court, based on the right of oblivion, is X v Journal de Genève.23 
Here, a rehabilitated offender succeeded in obtaining compensation for economic and mental harm 
arising from the publication of his name in connection with a previous conviction, in the context of a 
story of a new criminal trial against his former accomplice.24 The right to oblivion is not an absolute 
right, however, and will be balanced against the public’s right to information and a consideration as to 
whether or not that information remains newsworthy.25  
Without attempting a comprehensive definition of the right to be forgotten, and accepting that there 
are several perspectives of the right which may overlap to some degree,26 it is proposed here that a 
                                                             
18 This suggests a quite separate right to withdraw consent to the processing of the data; one which is not 
provided for in the current Directive. Arguably it is this right to withdraw consent, in conjunction with the right 
to call for the deletion of data, that the EC originally conceived of as constituting the right to be forgotten: this 
would explain why the EC’s definition of the right to be forgotten was as ‘the right [of individuals] to have their 
data deleted if they withdraw consent and if there are no legitimate grounds for retaining the data’, a definition 
which, according to Xanthoulis, is tautologous with the right of erasure: Napoleon Xanthoulis, ‘Conceptualising 
a Right to Oblivion in the Digital World’,  May 2012 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2064503> accessed 4 September 2014, 16 referring to 
Commission, ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World A European Data Protection Framework for the 21st 
Century (Communication’ COM 2012 9 final, 6.  
19 Proposed Regulation COM (2012) 11 final, art 7(3). 
20 Ambrose and Ausloos (n1) 1. 
21 Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke, ‘The Right to be Forgotten in the Internet Era’ (2012) 11 ICRI 
Working Paper, 4 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174896> accessed 28 August 2014. 
22 See, eg, Jasmine E McNealy, ‘The Emerging Conflict between Newsworthiness and The Right to be 
Forgotten’ (2012) 39(2) North Kentucky Law Review 119, 120;  Karen Eltis, ‘Breaking through the “Tower of 
Babel”: A “Right to be Forgotten” and How Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Reconceptualize Privacy Harm 
in the Age of Analytics’ (2011) 22(69) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Review 69, 
72, 85-86, 91; Noberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, ‘Oblivion: The Right to be Different… from Oneself. 
Reproposing the Right to be Forgotten’ (2012) 13 IDP (Revista De Internet, Derecho Y Política) 122, 124.  
23 Referring to A v Journal de Genève et de la Gazette de Lausanne, 23 10 2003, 5C156-2003 (2003), as cited 
and discussed by Werro: Franz Werro, ‘The Right to Inform v The Right to be Forgotten: A Transatlantic 
Clash’, in Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Christine Godt, Peter Rott and Leslie Jane Smith (eds), Liability in the 
Third Millennium (Nomos, 2009) 285, 290-291 .  
24 Werro (n 23) 290-291.  
25 Ambrose Ausloos (n 1) 1-2. 
26 See, generally, Koops (n 3).  
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better understanding of the ‘right’ is gained by viewing it is a right not to be indefinitely linked to 
information about one’s past (in line with the notion of oblivion). Whilst a right of erasure can be 
exercised in various situations which may or may not involve the passage of time, the notion of time, 
it is suggested, is intrinsic to understanding the right to be forgotten. This is not to say that the right to 
be forgotten must be regarded as an ex post right - exercisable only after the passage of a certain 
amount of time. For example, relying on the right to be forgotten as a justification for his proposal, 
Mayer-Schönberger suggests that expiry dates could be built into information when it is created. In 
this sense the right may also work ex ante.27 Although the right of oblivion has been described as ‘a 
complex and intriguing juridical instrument’,28 it is more difficult to conceptualise as a legal 
mechanism. A right to oblivion may be realised through the erasure of personal information,29 the de-
identification of information,30 the payment of compensation,31 or some other means. As such, the 
right to be forgotten (whatever its status as a human right, value or interest32) is best regarded as a 
justification for existing legal rights and technological measures or even, perhaps, the creation of new 
ones, rather than as a procedural or legal right in and of itself.  
To avoid confusion the erasure aspect of the right to be forgotten is referred to throughout the 
remainder of this paper as the ‘right to erasure’. The right not to be indefinitely linked to information 
about one’s past will be referred to, simply, as ‘the right to be forgotten’.  
3. The rationale for and status of the right of erasure and the right to be forgotten  
 
3.1 The status of the right of erasure  
As noted above, the right of erasure has been described, in the context of the EU data protection 
framework, as the right of an individual to call for the deletion of their personal information in certain 
circumstances. So formulated the right of erasure is a legal right, or procedural right, arising under 
data protection regulation.33 
3.2 The rationale for the right of erasure  
In the context of a data protection framework the right of erasure finds its rationale in the notion that 
individuals should have control over their personal information.34 Certainly the ability of internet 
                                                             
27 See further ibid 26. 
28 de Andrade (n 22) 123. 
29 Such as is the case within a data processing context where the information is no longer necessary or relevant 
or adequate in light of the purposes for which it was originally collected or is processed: see, generally, Google. 
30 See, eg, Jennifer Granick, ‘Convicted Murderer to Wikipedia: Shhh!’’ (Deeplinks Blog, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 10 November 2009) < https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/murderer-wikipedia-shhh>, 
discussing a cease and desist letter sent to Wikipedia requesting the suppression of the name of a former 
convicted murderer.  In relation to this matter see further: ‘Namen der Sedlmayr-Mörder Bleiben Online’, 
Digital, Süddeutsche.de (online), 17 May 2009 < http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/bgh-grundsatzurteil-
namen-der-sedlmayr-moerder-bleiben-online-1.144087 > (in German), referring to a ruling of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) allowing the name of the convicted murderer to remain online not 
least due to the public interest value of the story about the murder (considered one of the most ‘spectacular 
indictments in the history of German criminal law) and the adverse and significant impact upon the ability to 
maintain online archives. 
31 As was the case in X v Journal discussed by Werro (n 23). 
32 Koops (n 3) 2. 
33 See, eg, de Andrade (n 22) 125. 
34 Graux et al (n 21) 5; Reding, ‘Tomorrow’s Privacy’ (n 3) 4; see, also, European Parliament, ‘Resolution on 
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
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users to exercise effective control of the data they themselves put online was one of the reasons for 
the proposed right of erasure put forward by the EC Justice Commissioner.35 This notion of control, 
according to some theorists, should be regarded as underpinning the concept of privacy. Westin, for 
example, defined privacy as involving ‘the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.’36 
Others too have seen privacy in terms of the right of an individual to control or restrict access to 
themselves,37 although it is true to say that control-based theories of privacy are not universally 
accepted.38 Others have argued that the right of erasure should be seen as an aspect of the protection 
of personal data, a right guaranteed under Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, rather than an aspect of the right of privacy.39 That the right of erasure is often 
referred to as the ‘right to be forgotten’ suggests, too, that some of the values which underlie the right 
to be forgotten, discussed below, also form part of the rationale for a right of erasure. In other words, 
the right of erasure may be justified by a right to be forgotten.  
3.3 Status of the right to be forgotten 
The status of the right to be forgotten - whether as a right, value or interest - is, according to Koops, 
unclear.40 Xanthoulis has argued that the right should be conceptualised as a human right and, more 
specifically, as an expression of the broader right to privacy,41 whilst de Andrade has argued that it 
should be associated with a right to identity.42  Whether Google has added clarity in this regard will be 
considered in Part Five, following a summary of the decision in Part Four. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Regulation)’ COM (2012) 0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD), 12 March 2014 (‘Compromise Text’), 
Recital 6. 
35 Viviane Reding, ‘Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market’ (Press Release, Speech/10/327, 22 June 
2010), 4.  
36 Alan F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967) 25. 
37 Irwin Altman believes that privacy is ‘an interpersonal boundary control process, designed to pace and 
regulate interactions with others’: Irwin Altman, ‘Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis’ in Daniel H Carson (ed) 
Man-Environment Interactions: Evaluations and Applications, Part II (Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross,1974) Part 
6-8 3, 3; Nicole Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 
Law Quarterly Review 628, who defines privacy as ‘the state of “desired” inaccess’ or ‘freedom from unwanted 
access’, 636; Sidney M Jourard, ‘Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy’ (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 307, 307: ‘The wish for privacy expresses a desire to be an enigma to others or, more generally, a 
desire to control others’ perceptions and beliefs vis-à-vis the self-concealing person’ [references omitted]; Kirsty 
Hughes, ‘A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law’ (2012) 75(5) Modern 
Law Review 806. 
38 See, eg, Rebecca Wong, ‘Privacy: Charting its Developments and Prospects’ in Mathias Klang and Andrew 
Murray (eds), Human Rights in the Digital Age (Glasshouse Press, 2005) quoting Regan: “A further criticism of 
the control-based definition is its emphasis on individual autonomy, which has been identified as a weakness in 
formulating a policy to protect privacy.” See also W A Parent, ‘Privacy, Morality and the Law’, (1983) 12(4) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 269, 273.  
39 See, eg, Graux et al (n 21). Although the authors suggest that it is the ‘right to be forgotten’ rather than a right 
of erasure that has its basis in the right to the protection of personal data under Article 8 of the Charter, the 
authors distinguish the modern ‘right to be forgotten’ under the Proposed Regulation from the ‘right to 
oblivion.’  
40 Koops (n 3) 2. 
41 Xanthoulis (n 3) 84. Note, however, that Xanthoulis was not referring only to the right to be forgotten in terms 
of its oblivion aspect, but also in terms of its erasure aspect. 
42 See, generally, de Andrade (n 22).  
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3.4 Rationale for the right to be forgotten 
Various rationales underpin a right to be forgotten. One of these is the idea of rehabilitation,43 a notion 
that can be viewed both as an individual and a social good. That individuals are entitled to a second 
chance, which may involve having the ‘slate wiped clean’ after a period of time, is not a unique idea 
and underlies various laws relating to bankruptcy and spent convictions.44 Discussing the right to 
oblivion in Swiss cases involving offenders, such as that of X v Journal de Genève referred to above, 
Werro suggests that under Swiss law publishing the name of an offender who has served out his/her 
sentence will not be permitted unless the information remains newsworthy.45 Information is, he 
suggests, less likely to be considered newsworthy where the former criminal has ‘radically changed 
his life’.46 The right to oblivion is not only about escaping from records of crimes and former 
indebtedness, however. Allen believes that people have a ‘legitimate moral interest in distancing 
themselves from commonplace misfortunes and errors’47 and that without the ability to escape the past 
feelings can be hurt and lives ruined.48 Arguments along these lines have become particularly 
prevalent in the face of what has been described as the ‘iron memory’ of the internet49 and the ease by 
which digital data can be searched, accessed, and linked to other information.50 In particular, concern 
has been expressed as to the need to protect young people against youthful indiscretions or lack of 
judgment.51  
The fact that people can and do change over time is central to the idea of rehabilitation but also 
suggests a broader rationale for a right to be forgotten: one less concerned with the ability of 
individuals to escape past mistakes per se than with recognising that people should not be forever 
tethered to their past, unable to ‘escape their digital representations’.52 Mayer-Schönberger suggests 
that memory in fact impedes the ability of individuals to change: ‘by recalling forever each of our 
errors and transgressions, digital memory rejects our capacity to learn from them, to grow and to 
evolve.’53 In this sense, forgetfulness is seen as fundamental to the development of self and identity,54 
as well as to the capacity of individuals to make effective decisions.55 Being perpetually confronted 
with things from their past that they would otherwise, naturally, have forgotten or assimilated in time 
                                                             
43 Steven C Bennett, ‘The “Right to be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives (2012) 30(1) Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 161, 170; Werro (n 26) 290-291. 
44 McGoldrick (n 10) 765; Jean-François Blanchette and Deborah G Johnson, ‘Data Retention and the Panoptic 
Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness’ (2002) 18 The Information Society 33, 36-38; see also, for 
example, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990), Article 40: ’States Parties recognize the right of every child 
‘alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with 
the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability of 
promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.’ 
45 Werro (n 23), 291. 
46 ibid. 
47 Anita L Allen, ‘Dredging up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory and Surveillance (2008) 75(1) The University of 
Chicago Law Review 47, 57. 
48 ibid.  
49 Koops (n 3) 2. 
50 See, eg, Google 1074, para 80;  McGoldrick writes that one of the main drivers behind a right to be forgotten 
is the availability and accessibility of information over the internet: McGoldrick, (n 10) 762.  
51 Reding, ‘The EU Data Protection Reform 2012’ (n 16), 5; Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of 
Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton University Press, 2009) 5, 131; Proposed Regulation COM (2012) 11 
final, Recital 29 and art 17(1) referring to the special position of children; Bennett (n 43) 167; Eltis (n 22) 88. 
52 Mayer-Schönberger (n 51) 125. See also McNealy (n 22) 121. 
53 Mayer-Schönberger (n 51) 125.  
54 de Andrade (n 22) 126; Eltis (n 22), 88. 
55 Mayer-Schönberger (n 51) 117. 
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will, it has been suggested, make it difficult for individuals to live and act in the present ‘cognizant of, 
but not shackled by, past events’.56 This perspective focusses then not only on the future impact of 
persistent digital memory but on present consequences of that persistence. From this perspective, 
arguments have been put forward that without a right to be forgotten individuals will behave 
differently, for fear of the persistence of information about them, and may hesitate to act or speak 
authentically.57 This, in turn, impacts upon the development of democratic citizens and hence, in time, 
democratic societies.58  
Other objections to the persistence of digital memory focus less on what is known of the dangers 
posed by persistent remembering and more on what is not known. As Graux et al have pointed out 
‘[e]specially in today’s information society, it is practically impossible to predict all (negative) 
consequences of the use of personal data. And even if one can foresee a few, they tend to be abstract, 
distant and uncertain.’59 Indeed, Eric Schmidt, former Google CEO, was famously quoted as saying: 
‘I don't believe society understands what happens when everything is available, knowable and 
recorded by everyone all the time.’60 This concern has been echoed by others.61 
4 The Google decision  
Typing Costeja González’s name into Google Search today brings up links to news stories with 
headlines such as ‘The man who sued Google to be Forgotten’,62 ‘Costeja González and a Memorable 
Fight for the Right to be Forgotten’63 and ‘Spain’s Internet Warrior Who Cut Free from Google’s 
Tentacles.’64 Doing so also brings up links to the ECJ’s decision in the case, as well as links to news 
stories with rather more cynical headlines, such as ‘Will Europe Censor this Article?’65 Typing Mr 
González’s name into Google Search in 2009, however, would likely have revealed far fewer results66 
but would have included links to two announcements regarding the auction of property repossessed 
                                                             
56 ibid 12.   
57 Blanchette and Johnson (n 44) 36; Bernie Hogan, ‘The Presentation of Self in the Age of Social Media: 
Distinguishing Performances and Exhibitions Online’ (2010) 30(6) Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 
377, 378.  
58 Blanchette and Johnson (n 44) 36;  Stern describes situations in which the reactions of visitors to online 
presentations of self-instigated a change in self-concept, self-presentation and ultimately (in some cases) the 
author’s offline behavior:  Susannah Stern, ‘Producing Sites, Exploring Identities: Youth Online Authorship’ in 
David Buckingham (ed) Youth, Identity and Digital Media (MIT Press, 2008). 
59 Graux et al (n 21) 12.  
60 Holman W Jenkins Jr, Opinion, ‘Google and the Search for the Future’, The Wall Street Journal (online), 14 
August 2010 < http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704901104575423294099527212> .  
61 Anita Allen quotes Jim Gemmell as saying ‘What if I stored everything, what would it mean, what are the 
implications? We simply don’t know’: Allen, (n 47) 47 (references omitted); Eltis, (n 22) 88; Mayer-
Schönberger (n 51) 131. 
62 Reuters, ‘The Man Who Sued Google to be Forgotten’, Newsweek (Online), 30 May 2014  < 
http://www.newsweek.com/man-who-sued-google-be-forgotten-252854>.  
63 James Ball, News blog, ‘Costeja González and a Memorable Fight for the Right to be Forgotten’, The 
Guardian (online) < http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2014/may/14/mario-costeja-gonzalez-fight-right-
forgotten>. 
64 Ashifa Kassam, ‘Spain’s Everyday Internet Warrior who Cut Free from Google’s Tentacles’, The Guardian 
(online), 14 May 2014 < http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/spain-everyman-google-mario-
costeja-gonzalez >.  
65 Matt Ford, ‘Will Europe Censor this Article?’ The Atlantic (online), 13 May 2013 < 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/europes-troubling-new-right-to-be-
forgotten/370796/>.  
66 According to James Ball, the search results that Mr González took issue with consisted of a link to only one 
article (36 Spanish words long) whereas there are now ‘840 articles in the world’s largest media outlets’ about 
him:  Ball (n 63).  
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from Mr González as a result of outstanding social security debts.67 The notices were published in a 
Spanish newspaper in 1998, and then later in an online version of the newspaper.68   
In 2009 Mr González contacted the publisher of the newspaper complaining that when his name was 
entered into Google Search links to the announcements in the online newspaper appeared in the search 
results. He requested that the publishers erase the online data relating to the property sale, given that 
the debt proceedings had long been resolved and the data was therefore no longer relevant.69 The 
publishers refused to delete the information, arguing that its publication was justified on the basis of 
an order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.70 Mr González subsequently brought his 
complaint to Google Spain, which in turn forwarded it on to Google Inc.71 The complaint included a 
request that the links to the announcements about the auction be removed from the search results 
generated by Google’s search engine as a result of a search conducted on the basis of Mr González’ 
name.72 Mr González then lodged his complaint with the Spanish data protection authority, ‘Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos’  (‘the AEPD’).73 The complaint included two requests of Mr 
González, the first being that the publisher of the online newspaper either remove or de-identify the 
data relating to the property sale or protect Mr González’ data using tools made available by search 
engines.74 The second request was that Google Spain or Google Inc remove or conceal Mr González’ 
data so that it ‘ceased to be included in the search results and reveal links to the newspaper.’75 
The AEPD dismissed Mr González’ complaint relating to publication of the announcements in the 
newspaper on the ground that the publications were legally justified.76 The complaint relating to 
Google Spain and Google Inc (collectively ‘Google’) was, however, upheld. The AEPD called upon 
Google to ‘take the measures necessary to withdraw the data from their index and to render future 
access to them impossible.’77 Google subsequently appealed the AEPD’s decision to the Spanish High 
Court, the Audiencia Nacional, which, in turn, referred the matter to the European Court of Justice. 
The referral by the Spanish High Court concerned:  
the question of what obligations are owed by operators of search engines to protect personal 
data of persons concerned who do not wish that certain information, which is published on 
third parties’ websites and contains personal data relating to them that enable that 
information to be linked to them, be located, indexed and made available to internet users 
indefinitely.78 
The answer to that question depended upon the interpretation of certain provisions of the Directive 
which had been transposed into Spanish law in 1999.79 According to the Advocate-General, the 
referral by the Spanish High Court was the first time that the European Court of Justice had been 
                                                             
67 Google, Opinion of AG Jääskinen (‘Advocate-General Opinion’)1030, para 18. 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid.  
70 ibid. 
71 ibid 1030, para 19. 
72 ibid, para 20. 
73 ibid, para 21.  
74 ibid. The tools referred to are presumably exclusion protocols and code which can be utilised by the 
publishers of websites to exclude certain information from being indexed by search engines: Google, para 39. 
75 Advocate-General Opinion 1030, para 21.  
76 ibid, para 22. 
77 ibid. 
78 Google 1063, para 19.  
79 The Directive was transposed into Spanish law by Organic Law No 15/1999 of 13 December 1999: Google 
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required to interpret the Directive in the context of internet search engines.80 The Advocate-General 
observed that the questions referred to the ECJ fell into three categories, namely (a) the territorial 
scope of application of the EU data protection rules; (b) the legal position of an internet search engine 
service provider under the Directive, and (c) the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’.81 
In relation to questions falling into the first and second categories the European Court of Justice held 
that the operator of a search engine is to be regarded as ‘processing personal data’, within the meaning 
of the Directive, when it searches the internet for information about a person (which constitutes 
personal data within the meaning of the Directive), organises, stores and makes available that 
information – in the form of a link through its search results.82 As such, a search engine must be 
regarded as a ‘data controller’ within the meaning of the Directive vis-à-vis it’s processing of personal 
data. 83  In addition, even where the data controller is located outside of the territory (in this case 
Google Inc. was the operator of the search engine and therefore the actual data controller) the 
controller will have sufficient connection with the Member State, and be subject to the national 
provisions it adopts pursuant to the Directive, where the controller has established a branch or 
subsidiary within the territory that promotes and sells advertising space in connection with its search 
engine (directing its promotion to members of the territory in question).84   
Questions in the third category related to the interpretation and scope of Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of 
the Directive concerning, respectively, a conditional right for a data subject to call for the erasure of 
data, and to object to the processing of data on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his/her 
situation. A closer analysis of the Court’s finding in respect of these questions is undertaken below.  
4.1 Article 12(b): right of erasure 
Article 12(b) provides that Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from 
the controller, as appropriate:  
The rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with 
the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature 
of the data. 
 A question earlier mooted in relation to Article 12(b) and raised also in Google was whether or not 
the words ‘in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data’ are to be 
considered limitative.85 In other words, is the right restricted to situations where the personal data is 
incomplete or inaccurate? In this regard, the Google decision has confirmed that reference to the 
incompleteness or inaccuracy of the data is by way of example only and is not exhaustive, so that 
‘non-observance of the other conditions of lawfulness that are imposed by the Directive upon the 
processing of personal data’ will render the processing non-compliant and permit a data subject to call 
for the rectification, erasure or blocking of that data under Article 12(b).86 The ECJ further elaborated 
that a data subject will have the right to call for rectification, erasure or blocking of their personal data 
                                                             
80 Advocate-General Opinion 1028, para 7.  
81 ibid, para 6. 
82 Google 1066, para 28. Article 2(b) of the Directive relates to the processing of personal data: Dir 95/46/EC. 
83 ‘Controller’ is defined in Dir 95/46/EC, art 2(d). 
84 Google 1071, para 60. This decision was on the basis that Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive provides that each 
Member State shall apply the national law adopted pursuant to the Directive to the processing of personal data 
which is (inter alia) carried out in the ‘context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the 
territory of the Member State’: Dir 95/46/EC. 
85 Koops (n 3) 13.  
86 Google 1072-1073, para 70.  
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if the processing of that data does not comply with the principles of data quality in Article 6 of the 
Directive or with one of the criteria for making processing legitimate, as set out in Article 7. 
Importantly, this right is exercisable against any data controller who carries out non-compliant 
processing. Therefore even if the continued publication of the source information (in this case the 
newspaper notices about the real-estate auction) is lawful, further non-compliant processing (such as 
links in search results to that information) is not.87  
Article 6 stipulates that Member States are to provide that personal data must be processed fairly and 
lawfully.88 The Article also provides that data must be ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes’; and that data must be 
‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or 
further processed’.89 Further, data must be ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’ and kept in 
a form allowing for the identification of a data subject for ‘no longer than necessary for the purposes 
for which the data were collected or further processed.’90 The ECJ confirmed that even processing that 
is initially lawful may therefore become unlawful in the course of time where the data are no longer 
necessary in light of the purposes for which they were collected or processed, in particular where ‘the 
data appear inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and 
in the light of the time that has elapsed.’91 However, the Court emphasised that the relevant 
consideration for making a determination as to the relevance, adequacy and so forth of the data is the 
purposes for which data is processed by the search engine.92 As such, a data subject would be unable 
to argue against a link to personal information in search results simply on the basis that the 
information is no longer necessary (or is not adequate or relevant or is excessive) in light of the 
purpose for which it was collected or processed by another data controller. The question of whether 
processing is unnecessary or the data no longer relevant or adequate or is excessive must be 
considered in light of the purposes for which it is currently being processed by the data controller in 
question.93 Moreover, the Court made no findings that the personal data relating to Mr González in the 
search results displayed were unnecessary or inadequate or were irrelevant, excessive or inaccurate in 
light of the purposes for which that data was collected or processed by Google.94 Google – and indeed 
any operator of a similar search engine - would presumably be able to argue that almost any personal 
information, no matter how irrelevant it may be when considered in relation the purposes of its 
collection by a previous data controller, is relevant for its purposes, which are to search and provide 
access to information that is publically available on the internet.95  
A request for erasure under Article 12(b) may also be made where the processing of the information is 
not legitimate under Article 7 of the Directive. Article 7 requires Member States to make provisions 
allowing for processing of personal data only if the data subject has consented to the processing of 
                                                             
87 ibid 1076, para 88. Note that Google had sought to argue that the principle of proportionality required any 
requests for rectification, erasure or blocking of the personal information to be directed to the publisher of the 
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information inaccessible.’ Google 1071, para 63. 
88 Dir 95/46/EC, art 6(a). 
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91 Google 1077, para 93.  
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93 This was also the opinion of the Advocate-General: Advocate-General Opinion 1046-1047, para 98.  
94 The ECJ only observed that information and the links to it must be erased if it is found to be incompatible 
with the Directive because it is ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the 
purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search engine’: Google 1077, para 94.  
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data, or if the processing is necessary on one of the other grounds set out in Article 7(b)-(f). The ECJ 
noted that the processing of data under Article 7 must be authorised for the entire period that the 
processing is carried out.96  
Given that Mr González did not consent to the initial or further processing of the personal information 
in question (and given that none of the other provisions of Article 7(b)-(e) were applicable), the 
processing of Mr González’ information by Google was reliant upon it being necessary, under Article 
7(f). The effect of Article 7(f) is that processing of personal information is lawful if it is necessary for 
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by any third party to whom the 
data are disclosed, ‘except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).’97 As such, the question 
for the ECJ was whether Mr González’ rights (to prevent a link to information on a public website 
being displayed in search results) overrode the legitimate interests of Google and internet users who 
might utilise the Google search tool to conduct a search against Mr González’ name. In this respect 
the ECJ found that in a case such as the present a data controller’s economic interests alone cannot 
justify the interference with an individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly his right to 
privacy and the protection of his personal information, given the ‘potential seriousness’ of the 
interference in question.98 In the present case, the interference was so serious because, in the ECJ’s 
view, the inclusion of links in a search page following a search against an individual’s name allows 
internet users to obtain, through the list of results: 
a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the 
internet – information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life 
and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been 
only with great difficulty – and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him.99  
The ECJ noted that it is necessary to consider the interest of other internet users in addition to those of 
the data controller.100 Consideration of these third party interests, therefore, also required a balancing 
exercise to be carried out. However, the ECJ noted that the scales were not equal and that the 
fundamental rights of an individual to privacy and protection of personal information should ‘in 
situations such as that at issue override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the 
search engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search 
relating to the data subject’s name.’101 Salient factors in the court’s decision to strike the balance of 
interests in Mr González’ favour were that a great deal of time had elapsed between the subject matter 
of the original publication (the property sale for debt recovery purposes) and the sensitivity of the 
information in question.102 Nevertheless, the Court recognised that there may be situations where the 
balance would be struck differently: such as where the data subject is a public figure.103 
The court stressed that when evaluating the conditions for the application of the right to erasure under 
Article 12(b) (and the right to object under Article 14(a)) the court needed to consider ‘inter alia’ 
whether the data subject ‘has a right that the information in question relating to him personally should, 
at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search 
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made on the basis of his name…’104 The court held that a data subject did have that right and that it 
arose ‘in the light of his fundamental rights under Article 7 and 8 of the Charter [of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union].’105   
4.2 Article 14(a): right to object 
In addition to considering Article 12(b) of the Directive, the ECJ also considered the provisions of 
Article 14(a), which provides that Member States are to allow a data subject:  
At least in the cases referred to in Article 7 (e) and (f), to object at any time on compelling 
legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to 
him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there is a justified 
objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data.106 
Arguably Article 14(a) does not give a data subject any rights over and above those already set out in 
Article 12(b), but simply directs the data controller or the regulatory authority to take more specific 
account of the data subject’s situation when determining the legitimacy of processing based on Article 
7(e) or 7(f). This seems to be how the ECJ interpreted Article 14(b).107 In this case, Mr González’s 
situation required account to be taken of the fact that so much time had elapsed since the publication 
of the source information, the sensitivity of the information and the means by which the information 
was made available (via a link in a list of search results displayed following a search against his 
name).108  
4.3 Criticisms of the Google decision 
The ECJ’s decision in Google has been criticised for promoting the rights of individuals over the right 
to freedom of expression and the right to access information109 and, moreover, stating as an ‘automatic 
rule’ that the economic interests of a data controller will not override those of a data subject.110 As 
noted above, however, the way in which the ECJ struck the balance between the competing interests 
of the data controller and the data subject was particularly influenced by the ‘seriousness of the 
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interference’.111 The interference in question was the processing of data at issue in Google112– namely 
the linking to personal information concerning Mr González in a list of search results which appeared 
following a search made against his name. It is unfortunate, however, that the ECJ did not offer any 
explanation as to why it regarded the data controller’s interests in the processing of personal data for 
the purpose of its search facility as ‘merely economic’.113 After all, the Advocate-General had found 
that Google’s interests went beyond economic ones and included ‘(i) making information more 
accessible for internet users; [and] (ii) rendering dissemination of the information uploaded on the 
internet more effective.’114  
The ECJ also held that the data subject’s rights protected by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter override 
‘as a general rule’ the interest of internet users. This statement needs to be understood in the context 
of the matter before the court – namely the nature of the information (including its age, currency and 
sensitivity), the means by which the information was made available, and the need to consider 
whether the publication of personal information was in accordance with the Data Protection 
Directive.115 As to the latter it was incumbent upon the court to consider Article 1 of the Directive and 
its objectives, as stated in its preamble, from which it is apparent that the Directive ‘seeks to ensure a 
high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular their 
right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data’.116 It seems that the ECJ used the 
objective of the Directive as a reason for asserting that the data subject’s rights should, generally, 
prevail: at least in light of the nature of the interference.  
By contrast, the Advocate-General had observed that in all cases a data subject’s right to protection of 
his private life must be balanced with other fundamental rights and freedoms.117 This conclusion led 
the Advocate-General to engage in a detailed consideration of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
that would be affected if the inclusion of links to the information about Mr González’ previous debts 
were not included in the search results. In this regard the Advocate-General noted that an internet 
search engine service provider ‘lawfully exercises both his freedom to conduct business and freedom 
of expression when he makes available internet information location tools relying on a search 
engine.’118 Moreover, an internet user’s right to information would, according to the Advocate-
General, ‘be compromised if his search for information concerning an individual did not generate 
search results providing a truthful reflection of the relevant web pages but a ‘“bowdlerised” version 
thereof.’119 
The fact that the ECJ circumvented any detailed consideration of the extent to which the rights and 
freedoms of others would be affected should links to the notices concerning the sale of Mr González’ 
property be removed is curious indeed. Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
guarantees freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to receive and impart information and 
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ideas.120 Article 10(2) of ECHR provides that the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed in Article 10(2) 
may be subject to restrictions and conditions as prescribed by law and as are necessary in a 
democratic society including for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. An interpretation 
of the Directive such that the rights of third parties to receive information about the data subject are 
‘generally overridden’, albeit that this is with regard to the nature of the information and the 
seriousness of the interference, arguably fails to consider the extent to which that interference is 
proportionate in protecting the data subject’s rights to privacy. As noted by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in Węgrzynowski v. Poland121 ‘particularly strong reasons must be provided 
for any measure limiting access to information which the public has the right to receive.’122 Whilst 
this observation is made in the context of measures that interfere with the role of the press, the right to 
receive information under Article 10 ECHR is not limited to information provided by the press or in 
the course of journalistic activities. Moreover, in Węgrzynowski the ECtHR referred to previous 
decisions of the ECtHR which have ‘stressed the important contribution made by Internet archives to 
preserving and making available news and information. Such archives constitute an important source 
for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are 
generally free.’123 This is not to suggest that a search engine is to be treated in the same way as an 
archive. However, to some extent a search engine fulfils a similar role to an archive in that it is an 
important source for education and research, is readily accessible, and – certainly in the case of 
Google’s search engine and many others – is free. Indeed, Google itself has stated that its search 
facilities are a form of ‘library card catalogue for the Web.’124 On the other hand, it should be 
remembered that various tools and practices already exist that assist individuals (or businesses) to 
manage reputation on the internet: to some extent, these already affect the accessibility of 
information.125 
The ECJ decision has also been criticised for delegating to a private sector company the responsibility 
for conducting the balancing exercise required between a data subject’s rights, on the one hand, and 
those of the data controller and third parties on the other.126 However, it is an inherent and long-
standing principle of data protection regulation that (unless the data subject has consented to the 
processing of his/her data and unless the data controller is able to rely on another legitimate ground of 
processing) the data controller must only process data if is it necessary in their legitimate interests 
and, in each case, where those interests are not overridden by the interests of the data subject.127 There 
is nothing new, therefore, in the ECJ’s decision in Google in this respect: it only serves to highlight 
that data controllers may need to institute formal processes and procedures when making a 
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determination as to whether their interests (or those of third parties to whom the data is disclosed) are 
legitimate and not overridden by the interests of the data subject, where previously there may have 
been none. Indeed, the decision in Google should not mask the fact that the company already has 
considerable power to make decisions as to what content is made available on its various services, 
including YouTube.128 Moreover, allowing a private sector player to determine the balance does not 
preclude a data subject from submitting his/her request for erasure to a regulatory authority, in the 
event that the data controller does not grant the request.  
5 The status of the right to be forgotten following Google  
In his preliminary opinion in Google, the Advocate-General considered that:  
The Directive does not provide for a general right to be forgotten in the sense that a data 
subject is entitled to restrict or terminate dissemination of personal data that he considers to 
be harmful or contrary to his interests. The purpose of processing and the interests served by 
it, when compared to those of the data subject, are the criteria to be applied when data is 
processed without the subject’s consent, and not the subjective preferences of the latter.129  
It seems that the ECJ agreed with the Advocate-General in this respect. The ECJ’s findings were 
based fairly and squarely on an application of the criteria to be applied to processing of data without a 
data subject’s consent: namely the purpose of the processing and the interests served by it, when 
compared to the interests of the data subject. The ECJ did not need to look outside of the Directive in 
order to determine that Mr González had a right to request the erasure of the data in question from the 
search results – that right was provided for within the provisions of the Directive itself. In other 
words, the decision confirms the scope of the right of erasure available to a data subject under the 
Directive.130  
In determining the scope of the right of erasure under the Directive might it be said however, that the 
ECJ has recognised the existence of at least a limited right to be forgotten, as an aspect of the broader 
right to privacy? After all the ECJ held that Mr González was able to request that the information in 
question no longer be made available to the public on account of its inclusion in a list of search results 
‘in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.’131 This might suggest 
that Mr González does have a right not to be indefinitely linked to the information in question and that 
the right is an aspect of his broader rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. 
Unfortunately, and as noted above, the decision of the ECJ lacked any analysis of what those broader 
rights do in fact entail.  
Certainly, when balancing Mr González’ privacy rights with the countervailing interests of Google 
and internet users the age and currency of the information in question was a relevant factor in the 
                                                             
128 Jeffrey Rosen, ‘The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google’ 
(2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 1525, 1536. 
129 Advocate-General Opinion 1049, para 108.  
130 It should be noted that the right of a data subject to have information erased from search results is not the 
same as a right of data subject to call for the ‘complete deletion of the page from the indeses of the search 
engine’: see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the European Court 
of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González C131/12 (14/EN WP 225) 26 November 2014 (‘Article 29 Working 
Party 2014 Guidelines’), 9 [21]. This means that ‘[t]he page should still be accessible using any other terms of 
search.’ (Article 29 Working Party 2014 Guidelines, 9 [21]).  
131 Google 1077-1078, para 97. 
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ECJ’s decision to strike the balance in favour of the data subject.132 However, just because a particular 
consideration is relevant to determining how serious the interference with the privacy right is, or 
where an appropriate balance between competing interests should be struck, does not mean that 
consideration in and of itself is an aspect of the right of privacy. Moreover, the fact that there was an 
interference with Mr González’ privacy rights at all stemmed not from the nature of the information, 
including its age or currency/relevancy to the present day, nor the means of dissemination (an entry in 
search results), but from the fact that the case concerned the processing and communication, by 
electronic means, of personal information.133  
On the other hand, and as McGoldrick has noted, the idea of ‘reasonable expectation’ is ‘fundamental 
to the evolving scope of the right to privacy’ under EU (as well as US) law.134 If it can be said that – 
at least in certain circumstances - a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of 
information, even information in the public domain, on account of its age and currency, or relevancy 
to the data subject in the here and now, then we can be more confident in saying that the right to be 
forgotten is an aspect of the broader right of privacy. Because the ECJ did not consider these issues in 
any detail in Google, the case is of little assistance in determining whether the right to be forgotten is 
an aspect of the broader right to privacy. Nevertheless, the judgment does hint at a more nuanced 
understanding of privacy, which moves beyond the idea of a public/private dichotomy,135 and to some 
extent echoes aspects of Nissenbaum’s thesis that expectations of privacy are determined by the 
contexts in which information is gathered and subsequently used.136  
According to Nissenbaum a right to privacy is ‘neither a right to secrecy nor a right to control but a 
right to appropriate flow of personal information.’137 Whether the flow of information in any given 
context (or from one context to another) is appropriate can be determined, according to Nissenbaum, 
by the application of the contextual integrity framework. This framework involves identifying, firstly, 
whether or not a particular information flow violates an entrenched context-relative informational 
norm.138 Context-relative informational norms are norms which are ‘specifically concerned with the 
flow of information’ in a given context.139 Therefore, identifying the relevant norms requires, as a first 
step, identification of the prevailing context. Within that context, informational norms further depend 
upon identification of information subjects, senders and recipients (referred to as ‘actors’), and 
                                                             
132 It was of course only one factor: the means by which that information was disseminated was particularly 
relevant to the decision to strike the balance of interests in Mr González’ favour, as was the fact that Mr 
Gonzalez was not considered to be a public figure: ibid 1074-1075, para 81. 
133 The ECJ has previously held that the processing of personal data recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter concerns ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual’: see Advocate-General 
Opinion 1050, para 117 referring to Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert (references omitted).  As also noted 
by Advocate-General Jääskinen  ‘any act of communication relying on automatic means such as by means of 
telecommunications, e‑mail or social media concerning a natural person constitutes as such a putative 
interference of that fundamental right [to private life] that requires justification’: Advocate-General Opinion 
1050-1051, para 118. 
134 McGoldrick (n 10) 765. 
135 Cases such as Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 have already moved the debate about privacy 
beyond the traditional public/private dichotomy. See, further, Gavin Phillipson, ‘The “Right” of Privacy in 
England and Strasbourg Compared’ in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in 
Privacy Law (Cambridge, 2010) 184, 204.  
136 See generally Nissenbaum (n 12). 
137 Nissenbaum (n 12) 127 (emphasis in original). 
138 Nissenbaum (n 12) 140. 
139 Nissenbaum (n 12) 140-141. Nissenbaum uses the word ‘norm’ to refer to a prescriptive standard rather than 
to merely describe what is the ‘normal’ or ‘common’ practice in a given situation (page 138).  
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relevant transmission principles (such as legal and other constraints on the transmission of 
information).140   
Another important parameter in determining relevant informational norms is the attributes of the 
information in question, or the type and nature of the information.141 Depending on the context, 
information of a certain nature may or may not be considered appropriate according to the relevant 
context-relative informational norms. To use an example from a job interview context, information 
about an applicant’s marital status is generally considered inappropriate, whilst such information in a 
different context, say courtship, would be considered appropriate.142  Determining the attributes of 
information also involves a consideration of the conditions under which information is accessible. 
Depending on the form in which information is made available (whether, say, the information is 
digitised, placed online, or takes the form of words or of images) and the access conditions that apply 
to the information (for example, whether it is on a publically accessible website or is restricted to 
certain individuals/institutions), information can yield new information. One example, provided by 
Nissenbaum, is the placing of criminal records online with no access restrictions: 
Records placed on the Web may easily be harvested en masse by institutional information 
aggregators that facilitate grand sweeps of public records databases for inclusion in data 
warehouses…..[O]nline records allow in-depth targeting of particular individuals with the 
possibility of short-circuiting much effort if one is willing to pay the fee charged by 
information providers for dossiers of interest.143 
Whilst the ECJ made no reference to Nissenbaum’s work, comments made in the judgment about the 
nature of search engines certainly reveal an understanding of how novel flows of information can alter 
information attributes, and thus herald a departure from entrenched informational norms. Recall the 
passage, already quoted above, where the Court notes that the inclusion of links in a search page 
following a search against an individual’s name allows internet users to obtain, through the list of 
results: 
a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the 
internet – information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life 
and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been 
only with great difficulty – and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him.144 
According to the contextual integrity framework, when an information flow involves a change in the 
attributes of information, or in the actors or the applicable transmission principles, this should 
generate a ‘red flag’ and will constitute a prima facie violation of contextual integrity.145 Identification 
of a prima facie violation of contextual integrity, however, is only the first stage of the enquiry. The 
next stage of the enquiry involves an evaluation of whether the new flow in fact enhances the values 
of the context in which the information is gathered. There is recognition that new practices and flows 
of information may ‘sometimes be “better” than those prescribed by existing norms.’146 In order to 
determine whether this is the case it is necessary to ask ‘[w]hat might be the harms, the threats to 
autonomy and freedom? What might be the effects on power structures, implications for justice, 
                                                             
140 Nissenbaum (n 12) 141. 
141 Nissenbaum (n 12) 143. 
142 Nissenbaum (n 12) 144.  
143 Nissenbaum (n 12) 218-219. 
144 Google 1078, para 80.  
145 Nissenbaum (n 12) 182. 
146 Nissenbaum (n 12)  15. 
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fairness, equality, social hierarchy, democracy and so on?’147 However, it is not enough simply to 
identify the relevant moral and political factors affected by the new information flow. It is necessary 
to ask what those factors mean in light of the ‘contextual values, ends, purposes and goals.’148  
Nissenbaum herself has suggested that the contextual integrity decision heuristic promises an 
approach to assessing reasonable expectations of privacy that may be less arbitrary than the approach 
often taken by the courts.149 This is not the place to expand on that view, or to consider what might be 
the result if the contextual integrity heuristic is applied to the facts in Google. However, seen from a 
‘privacy as contextual integrity’ perspective, there is no contradiction in asserting that a person has an 
expectation of privacy vis-à-vis information in one context (for example, information appearing in a 
list of search results) and not in another (for example, the publication on a website of certain 
information). Whether that expectation of privacy is reasonable – or how, if so, it should be weighed 
against other rights and interests - is another matter.  
The contextual integrity framework also highlights the importance of understanding context-relative 
informational norms in accounting for technologies and practices that are often experienced as and 
described in terms of violations of privacy. Understanding how the passage of time renders 
information ‘de-contextualised, distorted, outdated, no longer truthful (but not necessarily false)’150 
also means that, depending on the circumstances, an appropriate flow of information may be achieved 
not by its erasure but by its contextualisation. This has been broadly recognised in a number of 
judgments of European courts. For example, in Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos 1 
and 2)151 the ECtHR held that, in the context of an Article 10 complaint pursued by a newspaper, the 
requirement to publish an ‘appropriate qualification’ to an article contained in an internet archive 
managed by the newspaper, where the article was known to be defamatory, would not violate its 
Article 10 rights.152 The ECtHR ‘noted with approval the fact that the domestic courts had not 
suggested that potentially defamatory articles should be removed from archives altogether.’153 This 
suggests that in cases concerning the continued online publication of materials held to be defamatory, 
the ability of the defamed to obtain suitable redress by the ‘addition of a degree of 
contextualisation’154 of the information at issue is an important consideration in determining whether 
the State has fulfilled its obligation to strike a balance between the rights provided for in Articles 8 
and 10 respectively.155 In terms of privacy invasive material, rather than defamatory material, perhaps, 
                                                             
147 Nissenbaum (n 12) 150.  
148 Nissenbaum (n 12) 182.  
149 Nissenbaum (n 12) 235 although it should be noted that Nissenbaum’s reference to an arbitrary approach to 
the application of the reasonable expectations test was in the context of its application in US Supreme Court 
cases. 
150 de Andrade (n 22) 127.  
151 European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application Nos 3002/03 and 23676/03 (10 June 2009) (‘Times 
Newspapers’). See also reference to the decision of the Italian Court of Cassation holding that even true 
information contained in an internet archive may need to be contextualised and updated in light of a data 
subject’s right to be forgotten see: Angelo Monoriti, ‘Digital Archives and Data Protection: The Right to Update 
and Contextualise Newspaper News’ (Studio Legale Associato, May 2013) <http://www.nctm.it/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/1370600267Privacyarchivi-online.pdf/>. 
152 Times Newspapers, para 47.  See also Węgrzynowski where the ECtHR suggested that the applicant could 
have sought an order for contextualisation of a defamatory article, contained in an online archive, by the 
addition of, say, an explanatory note: para 67. 
153 Węgrzynowski, para 59 citing Times Newspapers, para 47. 
154 McGoldrick (n 10) 775.  
155 On the issue of contexualisation and a decision of the Italian Court of Cassation holding that even true 
information contained in an internet archive may need to be contextualised and updated in light of a data 
subject’s right to be forgotten, see Monoriti (n 152). 
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as Eltis has suggested, ‘giving greater weight to time in search result ranking would serve to alleviate 
some of the distortions caused by dated information overshadowing more current data in the online 
context.’156 
6 The significance of Google and the future of the right to be forgotten  
6.1 Did Google invent a right to be forgotten? 
Some commentators have argued that Google found a right to be forgotten in the current Directive 
which no-one thought was there,157 or that the ECJ ‘invented’ a right to be forgotten.158 This paper has 
argued that the decision only applied a right of erasure which already existed under Directive.159 
Although the age and currency/relevancy of the information at issue in the proceedings was a relevant 
factor in determining the appropriate balance between the rights of the data subject and the rights of 
Google and third parties with access to information, it is difficult to discern from the judgment that a 
right to be forgotten is being conceptualised as an aspect of the broader right to privacy.  
Even if Google did not break new ground in terms of advancing an understanding of a right to be 
forgotten as a human right, its significance goes beyond the important findings on the material and 
territorial scope of the Directive. The implications of the ECJ’s findings on the scope of the right to 
erasure in the Directive, and the weight to be attached to a data subjects’ privacy rights vis-à-vis the 
countervailing rights of the data controller and internet users, are important, certainly for search 
engines. The implications for Google have certainly been significant.  As of 25 September 2014, 
Google had received more than 135,000 erasure requests, each of which is to be reviewed 
individually.160 In order to determine how to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of the 
data subject and other rights, Google has also instituted an Advisory Council and a series of 
consultation sessions run in seven European cities.161 The ECJ’s findings also have potential 
implications for other data controllers, such as social networking services, and even those who upload 
information to social networking sites where they are not subject to the household exemption under 
the Directive.162 The ruling also affects internet users, including those who access non-EU domains. 
Guidelines issued by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the implementation of the 
Google decision recommend that any de-listing of a data subject’s personal information, which is 
                                                             
156 Eltis (n 22) 86.   
157 Bob Gellman and Pam Dixon, Decision in Europe: Controversial Revival of Practical Obscurity: 
Implications of the Google Spain Case (20 May 2014) World Privacy Forum < 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2014/05/wpf-analysis-implications-of-the-google-spain-case/>.  
158 Breheny (n 5). 
159 This view is also shared by Mayer-Schönberger: Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Comment, ‘Omission of Search 
Results is Not a “Right to be Forgotten” or the End of Google’, The Guardian (online), 14 May 2014 < 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/13/omission-of-search-results-no-right-to-be-forgotten>.   
160 Drummond (n 7) 43:44.  
161 Google Advisory Council at < https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/>. Although at least one critic has 
billed this process as little more than a PR stunt: see Sam Schechner and David Roman, ‘Google Seeks Views in 
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162 In the opinion of the Article 29 Working Party a data controller involves a social networking service since 
they ‘determine both the purposes and the means’ of processing and have also opined that those uploading to 
SNS can also be considered controllers unless subject to the household exemption: Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of “Controller” and “Processor” (2010), at 21, referring to 
their earlier opinion (WP 163) of 2009. In light of the Google decision as to who is a data controller, this 
opinion seems correct.  
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required to give effect to the data subject’s rights following Google, should not be limited to EU 
domains:  
The adequate implementation of the ruling must be made in such a way that data subjects are 
effectively protected against the impact of the universal dissemination and accessibility of 
personal information offered by search engines when searches are made on the basis of the 
name of individuals……In that sense, limiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds that 
users tend to access search engines via their national domains cannot be considered a 
sufficient means to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the 
judgment. In practice, this means that in any case de-listing should also be effective on all 
relevant domains, including .com.163 
However, it must be remembered that the balance between a data subject’s rights to privacy and the 
rights of third parties might well be struck differently to the way in which the balance was struck in 
Google, depending on the means by which the information is made available, and the nature and 
extent of the ‘interference’ at issue.  
6.2 Proposed Regulation and Compromise Text 
The European Commission’s proposal for the new Data Protection Regulation was finalised in 
2012.164 The Proposed Regulation has gone through a Committee process culminating in a Report on 
the Proposed Regulation,165 following which, in March 2014, the European Parliament endorsed a 
compromise text of the Data Protection Regulation (‘the Compromise Text’).166 The heading of 
Article 17 (originally titled ‘a right to be forgotten and to erasure’) was changed to ‘a right to 
erasure.’167 This title is more reflective of the fact that Article 17 does not provide per se for a right to 
be forgotten. A number of amendments to the wording of Article 17 as originally proposed by the EC 
were also endorsed by the Parliament.  
Detailed consideration of Article 17 as per the Compromise Text is beyond the scope of this paper, 
particularly as that text is still subject to scrutiny by the Council of Ministers in accordance with the 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure.168 However, broadly speaking, Article 17(1) of the Compromise Text 
is more explicit than Article 12(b) of the Directive as to the grounds upon which a data subject can 
call for the erasure of data, and extends the grounds by allowing a data subject to call for erasure upon 
the withdrawal of consent. Nevertheless, the overall effect of Article 17(1) is less generous to data 
subjects. Whereas the right of erasure (or rectification or blocking of data) under the Directive was 
automatic upon certain conditions being met (essentially that processing does not comply with the 
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164 Proposed Regulation COM (2012) 11 final.  
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Directive169), under the Regulation erasure is never automatic. In each case consideration has to be 
directed to whether or not retention is necessary for, among other things, the exercise of the right of 
freedom of expression in accordance with Article 80.170 Article 80, in turn, provides that Member 
States are to provide for exemptions or derogations from certain provisions of the Regulation – 
including those in Article 17 - whenever this is necessary ‘to reconcile the right to protection of 
personal data with the rules governing freedom of expression in accordance with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’171  Data controllers may then be able to argue that they 
should be permitted to retain even material which has been unlawfully processed or which is no 
longer necessary in light of the purposes for which it was collected or processed, in view of any 
exceptions or derogations made pursuant to Article 80. Depending on what exemptions or derogations 
Members States make in accordance with Article 80, the amendment arguably tips the scales against 
an individual’s rights to privacy and protection of personal information. Whereas the current Directive 
provides that derogations may be made from certain of its provisions where data is processed ‘solely 
for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression,’172 Article 80 of the 
Compromise Text is not so limited. 
6.3 The future of the right of erasure and the right to be forgotten 
As noted in the previous situation, an appropriate flow of information might be achieved by the 
contextualisation of that information rather than its erasure. That the Compromise Text adopts and an 
‘all or nothing’ approach - allowing the erasure of information which is processed in a way that is 
non-compliant– might therefore be seen as a missed opportunity. Allowing regulatory authorities 
more power to order the contextualisation of information (in whatever form that contextualisation 
may take) rather than, necessarily, its deletion might also help address some of the objections which 
have been vociferously pursued in response to the Google decision and the inclusion of a ‘right of 
erasure’ in the Compromise Text.  
In the meantime, those objections are likely to continue, as are the calls for further development of a 
right to be forgotten. However this debate plays out, the ECJ’s decision in Google is likely to be 
remembered as a ‘watershed in the evolution of the infosphere – the informational environment 
represented by our increasingly hyper-connected world.’173 For Mr González the decision has resulted 
in something of a curious irony: his bid not to be indefinitely linked through Google search to 
information concerning his debts was successful, but as a result of that success he is likely to be 
linked to the information he wished forgotten for a long time to come.  
7. Conclusions  
The ECJ’s decision in Google did not invent a right to be forgotten, but only applied a right of erasure 
which already existed under the Data Protection Directive. It is difficult to discern from the judgment 
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that a right to be forgotten is being conceptualised as an aspect of the broader right to privacy. The 
proposed new Data Protection Regulation will give individuals a right to call for erasure of their 
personal information, in certain circumstances, but not a right to be forgotten.  
 
